June 08, 2004

More on obesity and voting

Apparently I'm not the only one who noticed a potential connection between obesity and voting. Ken Hirsch pointed me to this article by Kevin Drum making a similar argument. Kevin points to the same figure which Craig pointed out in his comments on the original post:

Note: I have neither verified the figure nor attempted to actually compute correlations on the data. I'm just making a qualitative observation. See, however, Ken Hirsch's report of a .238 correlation in the original post.

Posted by ekr at 09:59 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Where are the audits of VoteHere?

A number of the people who responded to my post on Open Source and e-voting (see both the comments section and Ed Felten's post at Freedom to Tinker) argued that voting was a potential special case and might see more audit than your average piece of Open Source software. This morning, I happened to notice that VoteHere published their source code back in April. It's not quite Open Source--there are some license restrictions, but they don't look particularly restrictive. And yet, I haven't seen any published audits of this code.

As usual, Bruce Schneier delivers the money quote in the above MSNBC article:

Schneier said he didn't plan to analyze the source code -- and wondered whether any serious security experts would take on the challenge. "That would take 80 to 100 hours of my time, and no one's going to pay me," he said.

I suspect a lot of people feel that way.

Posted by ekr at 07:18 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

80% of spam from Trojans?

I know I've mentioned the problem of spam zombies before. I just saw this Register article claiming that 80% of spam now comes from spam zombie networks. Unfortunately, the article just points to this one-pager that doesn't describe any of the details so it's impossible for me to assess whether it's true or not. It sure would be nice for companies who publish this kind of stuff to actually document their methods.
Posted by ekr at 07:03 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

June 07, 2004

Pimp My Ride

I am currently watching what may be the first great television show of the 21st century: MTV's Pimp My Ride. Xzibit and a bunch of insane car customizers are let loose on some loser and their old beater. They then proceed to completely remodel the vehicle, starting by fixing everything that's wrong and then going way over the top with some set of modifications that no sane person could want in their vehicle, generally involving a neon system and installing a video screen somewhere. It's kind of like Monster Garage meets Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.

In the edition of Pimp My Ride that I just finished watching, they install a whole new stereo system but leave it all under plexiglass so you can see the inner workings. I actually find this fairly disturbing because I figure that we're only about two years away from having a case modding show hosted by Commander Taco and called "Pimp My Computer".

Posted by ekr at 07:54 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

June 06, 2004

Open source won't save e-voting

In a NYT Magazine article published may 30th, Clive Thompson argues for Open Source code for electronic voting machines:
First off, the government should ditch the private-sector software makers. Then it should hire a crack team of programmers to write new code. Then -- and this is the crucial part -- it should put the source code online publicly, where anyone can critique or debug it. This honors the genius of the open-source movement. If you show something to a large enough group of critics, they'll notice (and find a way to remove) almost any possible flaw. If tens of thousands of programmers are scrutinizing the country's voting software, it's highly unlikely a serious bug will go uncaught.

It may very well be a good thing to have Open Source software for voting, but the assumption that underlies Thompsons's argument--that Open Source is somehow a magic engine for producing bug-free software--is transparently false. Open Source software, like all software, is riddled with bugs. Many of these bugs have security implications. Moreover, these bugs can persist for long periods of time. For instance, the Linux mremap() problem (CAN-2004-0077, described here) has been in every Linux kernel since at least 2.2 (released in 1999) and was only discovered in March of 2004. Alternately, consider the OpenSSL buffer overflows. These had been around since at least 1998 and probably earlier but were only found in 2002. So much for tens of thousands of programmers finding any serious bug.

The truth of the matter is that--contrary to popular myth--practically nobody bothers to audit any Open Source code. Auditing code is a mind-destroyingly boring exercise and it's not even clear what percentage of vulnerabilities a good audit actually finds (practically no research has been done on this point). I'm probably one of the 50-100 people most qualified to audit OpenSSL: I'm a security guy specializing in SSL who uses OpenSSL on a regular basis and I've spent substantial amounts of time groveling through the source code. But the only time I look for security holes is if I happen to run into something that looks fishy. Noone I know seriously believes that we've found the last security hole in OpenSSL or Linux.

This isn't to say that auditing source code isn't worthwhile. It's just that the idea that we can audit the bugs out of a piece of code is in my view fundamentally misguided. What audits are useful for is getting an idea of how good the overall code quality is. If you audit selected pieces of a piece of software and you find a bunch of serious errors, it's safe to conclude that the company needs to shoot the programmers and start over. So, for instance, when Kohno et al. found a bunch of problems in Diebold's e-voting system, the conclusion to draw wasn't that these were all the problems that there were but rather Diebold didn't have the first clue how to write secure software. As Avi Rubin's page on e-voting points out:

To help mitigate the risks identified in the security analyses, Maryland proposed a set of technological changes to Diebold's voting machines as well as procedural changes to the election process. While this may help "raise the bar," it is impossible to know whether any security analysis identifies all the possible vulnerabilities present in an analyzed system. By only patching the known vulnerabilities, Maryland is not actually ensuring that the voting system will be secure. Rather, Maryland should follow security engineering best practices, which state that security can only be assured through a rigorous design process that considers security from a project's conception, not through a set of patches applied after the fact.

So, if we're going to have e-voting, what we really need is a procedure that allows for routinized and systematic review of voting systems. The purpose of this review is not to find vulnerabilities--though of course it would be nice to fix any that are found--but rather to assess whether the vendor is following good software engineering practices, with serious consequences if they are not. Open Source might or might not help us get that sort of review--personally, I expect that to get really thorough review you'll need to pay people to do it--but just making the code Open Source doesn't improve the situation much at all.

Posted by ekr at 02:58 PM | Comments (11) | TrackBack (0)

June 05, 2004

Reagan is dead

So, Reagan has finally died. It feels strange. My first real political memory is of Reagan being shot by John Hinckley. I'm not looking forward to having half the federal buildings in the country being named for Reagan, though...
Posted by ekr at 08:01 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

June 04, 2004

Buying DDoS attacks

It's been common knowledge in the security community that you could buy DDoS attacks on third parties, but generally the Black Hats don't make a big deal about it in public. However, Alexei Roudnev just received this advertisement which he posted to NANOG (the North American Network Operators Group):
Dear sirs.

We are glad to you to give qualitative service, on elimination of sites. We can kill any site by our attack, which have name 'DDos attack'. We have already killed hundreds Russian and foreign sites. If you have enemies, and It is necessary to get rid of them, ask us and we will help with pleasure.

The prices at us low, 60 dollars for 6 hours. 150 dollars day. Destroy any project on the Internet with the help of ours DDos service. Payment prinimaetsja in sisteme WebMoney.

Contacts: ICQ 783603.

(translated from Russian by Alexei).

Outstanding. Now I can finally get rid of my enemies over at I Could Be Wrong.

Posted by ekr at 08:17 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

June 03, 2004

Doh!

For the past month or two I've been regularly scanning the spam folder for false positives and deleting everything else. I always knew that this was a lousy, error-prone procedure but it just cost me something. I'd been waiting for a response from someone and noticed that I never got one so I went back to my mail logs and saw that it had been incorrectly filed as spam and I'd apparently deleted it. Luckily, I was able to extract it from my backups, but all in all kind of a close call. So, Command Decision: instead of deleting the spam, I now shove it into a second spam folder which I can keep around for a month or so for precisely this eventuality. Outstanding.
Posted by ekr at 07:47 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

June 02, 2004

How did the we break the Iranian code?

There's a really surprising report in today's New York Times. According to the report, Ahmad Chalabi told the Iranians that we'd broken their secret code. It's surprising isn't that Chalabi told them--I've figured he was a weasel for quite some time now--but that we were able to break their code at all.

Cryptographic systems generally consist of two pieces:

  • An algorithm--the cryptographic function itself.
  • A key--a short piece of secret information that is used to control the operation of the algorithm.

Now, here's the important bit: the systems are designed so that you can't read transmissions for which you don't have the key even if you know the algorithm. I and my worst enemy can use the same algorithm and he can't read my messages unless he knows my key--at least in principle.

So, with this in mind, here are some possibilities for what might have happened:

  1. The Iranians used a standard algorithm such as AES, 3DES, etc. but it turns out that the NSA (or whoever) knows how to cryptanalyze that algorithm. This would be an incredibly big deal, since at least in the public sector we have no good idea how to attack these algorithms. And AES and 3DES in particular have been vetted by the NSA, so they should be secure. If the NSA had broken these algorithms, I doubt they'd tell anyone who would even think of telling Chalabi. So, I don't think this explanation is that likely.
  2. The Iranians are using standard algorithms but have bungled the key management. For good compromise containment, each facility should use a different key and you should change those keys frequently. If the Iranians didn't do one of these things, then a single black bag job on their embassy might be sufficient to compromise a good fraction of their traffic. This seems pretty likely: bad key management is a frequent problem with cryptographic systems.
  3. The Iranians are using non-standard algorithms--they don't trust the NSA not to have broken the standard ones--and the NSA broke the Iranian algorithms. If you're a small country designing your own algorithms doesn't sound crazy initially, but actually it is. Algorithm design is hard and it's easy to design something that's badly insecure. There are a lot of believed to be good algorithms that the NSA had no hand in designing, and in fact were designed by people who considered the NSA part of their threat model. So, if you don't trust AES you can always use Blowfish or IDEA. Even if for some reason (national pride, paranoia) you feel you need to design your own algorithm, the safe thing to do is to superencrypt--encrypt the data first using your own algorithm and then encrypt the ciphertext with AES. This protects you against either algorithm being broken. Finally, if you really don't trust the NSA and you're just encrypting small amounts of diplomatic traffic, just use a One-Time Pad, which is provably secure. You can move they keying material around in DVDs in your diplomatic bags. Nevertheless, this seems like a fairly likely case. For some reason having a homegrown cipher algorithm seems to be a point of national pride, and superencrypting would be pretty much admitting you don't trust your own cryptographers.
  4. It's all a hoax and the NSA is reading the traffic some other way, perhaps by bugging the Iranian embassy. In this case, the NSA might actually want to have it spread around that they've broken the Iranian codes since it makes them look extremely competent and there's a good chance that the Iranians will change codes and then be confident that their communications are secure.
  5. It's all a complete hoax and the NSA never could read the Iranian communications.

It would be interesting to know what really happened.

UPDATE: Justin Mason suggests a variant of the fourth possibility: the Iranians were sold crypto equipment with backdoors. Given the easy availability of modern crypto software, you would think it would be pretty easy to avoid this kind of situation.

Posted by ekr at 03:07 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

Stupid disclaimers

Slate has a nice piece debunking those ubiquitous e-mail disclaimers that companies often require employees to put at the end of their messages. Unsurprisingly, the conclusion is that they're basically legally unenforceable. I know that I generally ignore them.
Posted by ekr at 09:11 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

A stuffed shirt full of hot air

This Spanish company has invented the Dressman. Basically, it's a gizmo that lets you press a shirt without an iron. Basically, it's a human upper-body form that inflates with hot air. You put the wet shirt on the dummy and turn it on and then it dries and presses the shirt in one operation. Kind of clever, actually. Would be more useful if I wore shirts that needed pressing more than once every 3 months.
Posted by ekr at 07:38 AM | Comments (5) | TrackBack (0)